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1.  Introduction 
The  fact  that  institutions  evolve  across  time  and  differ  across  contexts  has  been  translated  into  a  well 
developed  and  intriguing  research  topic  that  lies  at  the  boundaries  of  political  science,  economics  and 
sociology. Within this research field, the focal point of this paper is the study of the process of emergence of 
novel institutions and the identification of factors that may influence the outcome of this process. Being aware 
of the broadness of the concept of “institution”, in this paper we view institutions as “commonly accepted sets 
of rules that influence actors decisions” and focus on state-mandated sets of rules i.e. regulations.  
We  consider  regulations  as  endogenously  emerging  institutions  that  evolve  in  accordance  to  other 
socioeconomic factors and seek to identify the mechanism that facilitates the emergence of new regulations as 
well as the factors that determine the outcome of the regulatory process. The regulatory process is a formal 
policy process whose analysis primarily belongs to the sphere of political science and this is where our quest for 
existing research on institutional emergence and change commences.  Seeking to understand the nature of, 
initially, any policy process we begin with Hogwood and Gunn (1984), who suggest that any public policy 
“needs to have been generated or at least processed within the framework of governmental procedures, 
influences and organizations” (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 24). This approach implies two basic points; firstly 
that any type of public policy is a result of a timely and cumulative process and, secondly, that any policy 
process involves purposeful interactions among different types of actors. These two premises have already 
been argued for: the cumulative nature of the policy process has long been argued for as policy institutions 
change by building on their own history (March and Olsen, 1998) and hence current changes in the political 
sphere can be seen as part of a sequence of earlier changes and as setting the scene for future evolutionary 
developments (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In turn, the centrality of interactions between agents representing 
different interests and beliefs has been pointed by views suggesting that the policy process is one characterized 
by the dynamics of agents´ mobilization, persuasion and negotiation (e.g. Slembeck, 1997). Some important 
implications arise from these characteristics of the policy process; the first one refers to path dependencies 
and possible lock in phenomena attributed to the cumulative nature of the process and the second involves 
learning  effects,  and  power  interplays  that  are  linked  to,  both,  the  cumulativeness  and  the  continuous 
interactions of agents.  
Path dependencies are increasingly becoming part of the political science vocabulary when describing the 
policy process especially aiming to emphasize the notion of self-reinforcing processes (Pierson, 2000). Path 
dependencies are possible sources of lock-in phenomena which are common in politics due to inherent aspects 
of the policy process; more specifically, in politics agents rarely achieve important changes acting individually 
rather collective action is fundamental to policy change. Hence, individuals might be exposed to information 
that has been selected from other agents and therefore they may be “victims” of agenda-setting effects (Witt, 
2003) which in turn result in unintentionally biased policy choices. Further, changes of rules and patterns are 
mostly dependent on authority rather than exchange and contracts (as in economics) while the existence of 
rigid institutions orchestrating the policy process make reversals and changes increasingly unattractive (North, 
1990). Finally, even if mistakes become apparent, policy change requires long time periods due to the variety of 
stakeholders  with  sporadic  participation  and  minor  (individual)  influence  and  because  of  the  difficulty  of 
evaluation of policy action in the short term (Pierson, 1993, 2000). Yet, the lack of perfect information and the 
constraints  on  available  knowledge  posed  on  all  types  of  agents  (voters,  bureaucrats,  policy  makers, 
representatives  of  interest  groups)  are  likely  to  induce  agents  to  make  further  efforts  to  improve  their  
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knowledge, alter their choices and induce purposeful action. Then political evolution can be seen as a learning 
process whereby agents improve their knowledge capacity and are able to influence and change the set of 
rules surrounding their action. Hence, changes of political perceptions and beliefs can be justified on the 
grounds that politics are a subtype of social evolutionary process that relies on knowledge accumulation for its 
evolution (Modelski, 1996).  
The above considerations direct us to propose that the policy process is an evolutionary process fueled by 
knowledge  accumulation  and  transmission  that  is  facilitated  by  purposeful  actors  whose  perceptions  and 
choices vary and evolve. Such a process resembles the innovation process that is as well described as an 
accumulation of knowledge-seeking activities, stressing the interest of agents to gain knowledge about their 
environment and about the opportunities it offers (McKelvey, 1996).  In this paper we shall carefully draw a 
parallel  between  the  innovation  and  the  regulatory  process  and  seek  to  understand  how  institutional 
innovations come about, what are the types of interactions and negotiations that shape common approaches 
to  policy  problems  and  how  are  new  policies  diffused  and  implemented  into  a  system  comprising  of 
heterogeneous agents.  
Considering the above as the core attributes of the process of evolution and seeking to analyze the European 
regulatory process through an evolutionary lens, we expect this process to be characterized by a variety of 
actors  whose  interactions  contribute  to  the  accumulation  and  transmission  of  knowledge  and  lead  to 
continuous changes and improvements based on existing conditions. Our expectations are met considering the 
structure of the political system within which this process takes place as well as the characteristics of the 
process  itself.  Section  Two  provides  the  empirical  context  of  our  analysis;  Section  Three  discusses  the 
evolutionary attributes identified in the regulatory process; Section Four continues with the in depth analysis of 
the European regulatory process which we investigate in each of its steps and Section Five discusses the 
manner  in  which  evolutionary  mechanisms  guarantee  the  facilitation  of  the  emergence  and  evolution  of 
institutions.   
2.  Empirical context 
This paper is empirically contextualized in the European political system, the detergents industry and specific 
regulations formulated at European level. Data has been collected through secondary resources (i.e. policy 
reports, existing studies for the industry, archival documentation of governmental agencies) and 26 in-depth 
interviews (13 private companies (large and small), 4 industrial associations (national and European), 7 policy 
makers (national and European) and 4 NGOs (national and European branches)). 
The European political system is characterized by its non-hierarchical institutional design (implying different 
levels and arenas that are characterized by a high degree of institutional and functional interdependence due 
to  intense  interlocking  between  supranational  and  national  institutions),  the  non-majoritarian  mode  of 
decision making (which places negotiations among the relevant actors at the core of the decision making 
process) and the dynamic relationship between various decision-making levels (Grande, 2001).   
The consequences from this list of characteristics are summarized in a high demand for policy coordination and 
a partial redistribution of power between the organizations involved; this creates advantages for those actors 
who act at the interfaces between levels and arenas of decision making and significantly increases the number 
of strategic options for the actors involved. Placing actors and their interactions at the core of the decision  
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making process, the European system of multi-level governance has produced a distinctive type of interest 
representation with a high number of points of access and increased possibilities of interest groups to influence 
public policy making.  
Within this fragmented and continuously transforming system (Coen, 1997; Knill, 2001) the regulatory process 
is  a  dynamic  institutional  structure  that  evolves  to  meet  challenges  posed  by  developments  such  as 
globalization, technological change and crisis situations. Nowadays, EU regulations are an outcome of the co-
decision process that was introduced in 1992 after the Maastricht Treaty, built on the rationale of enhancing 
the democratic functioning of the EU (Crombez, 1997), namely increasing participation and transparency. The 
co-decision process applies to most of the regulations related to the Internal Market program and, briefly, 
works on the rule that a legislative proposal, after its introduction by the European Commission, can only 
become EU policy with the approval of both the Parliament and the Council (see Annex One for the detailed 
steps of the process). 
The co-decision process increased the steps of the legislative process, increased the density and frequency of 
interactions, and created new access channels to various interest representation groups (i.e. NGOs, industrial 
associations or individual firms). This institutional change provided a further and more formal guarantee that a 
variety of interests are actively represented in the regulatory process and was accompanied by a redistribution 
of institutional responsibilities and influencing power.  The large scope and number of issues to be solved 
through  this  process  combined  with  the  understaffing  of  the  public  apparatus  (Bouwen,  2001)  has  been 
increasing the demand for expert knowledge available by non-governmental actors. Within this setting, agents 
that possess the most relevant and reliable information are the ones granted access to the regulatory process 
and the ones most likely to influence its outcome.  Given the stage and timely character of the regulatory 
process from its initiation to its implementation, the evaluation of the quality of information provided by 
private agents takes place at various stages via formal consultations and expert group meetings, or informal 
communication among the participants. Broscheid and Coen (2003), suggest that the institutional structure of 
the European political system has inbuilt incentive and sanction mechanisms with regards to the transmission 
of valuable and false information; incentive mechanisms can take the form of privileged access to information 
about  policy  intentions,  grants  and  favorable  term  contracts,  while  sanctions  mechanisms  to  restrict 
opportunistic behavior are usually imposed by future exclusion from the negotiations. 
The non-governmental protagonists of the regulatory process in our case represent the detergents sector. This 
industry dates back to the first half of the century and the extended use of its products has induced regulatory 
activity since the sixties. The strong link of the industry with the general public and the early exposure of its 
representatives to governmental controls in the form of regulations justify why the industry is an interesting 
case for analyzing the mode of participation of private agents in the regulatory process and consequently the 
changing boundaries between market and non-market organization. The incorporation of the detergents secort 
in the chemicals industry and the domestic use of its product, guarantees the continuous interest of public 
authorities in the activity of companies, and hence public intervention remains a relevant issue until today, 
offering a more than forty years period for inquiry.  
Seeking to understand and explain why existing pieces of regulation ended up taking their current form and 
identify the factors that contributed to their pattern of evolution we use the most relevant regulations for the 
operations of the detergents industry. These are the 2004 Detergents Regulation, the new chemicals regulation 
dealing with the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemical substances (REACH) and  
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the Globally Harmonized System for Classification and Labeling (GHS). A brief overview of their content as well 
as their historical evolution are presented in Appendixes Two, Three and Four respectively.    
3.  Evolutionary attributes of the regulatory process 
3.1  Path dependence, legal paradigms and learning 
The concept of institutional path dependencies has been recognized by institutional economists as useful for 
explaining the long-term persistence of institutions even when they are considered inefficient (North, 1990) 
and has been used for the analysis of legal change to describe the persistence of differences in legislation 
between  different  political  systems  on  the  grounds  that  national  political  systems  persist  and  resist 
harmonization  (Heine  and  Kerber  2002).  The  European  regulatory  process  has  inbuilt  elements  of  path 
dependence  due  to  the  strong  interrelation  and  dependence  of  institutional  structures  on  the  existing 
legislative plexus and the fact that legislative change takes the form of legislative succession and the revision of 
clauses and annexes of existing legal texts. The examples of the 2004 Detergents Legislation and REACH are 
indicative of this case
1.  
These  examples  also  highlight  that  regulations  and  policies  evolve in  response  to  the  changing  nature  of 
problems and the problem-solving heuristics. The latter is the underlying notion of a paradigm developed 
initially by Kuhn (1970) and developed later by Dosi (1982). Applying the notion of technological paradigms to 
the case of legislation Heine and Kerber (2002:57) interpret legal rules as “socio-technological instruments” 
that attempt to solve problems of human interaction in societies and develop the concept of “legal paradigms” 
as structures “embodying an outlook, a definition of the relevant, problems and trade-offs, and a certain 
pattern of enquiry and heuristics for solving, new emerging problems”. The analogy between technology and 
legal rules has also been used by Eckardt (2004) who describes new statutory laws as “legal innovations” that 
are generated within a legal paradigm. For Eckardt (2004) legal paradigms refer both to the cognitive frame 
within which novel legal problem-solutions are looked for, as well as to the methods used to generate and 
disseminate legislative innovations. We find that shifts into new legal paradigms may be attributed to, both, 
advancements of knowledge as well as arising legislative inefficiencies. Political accountability enhances the 
incentives of policy entrepreneurs to improve their knowledge and develop new problem-solving heuristics, as 
in politics losses are not restricted to financial resources but also to the loss of governing power.  
The case study material revealed three examples of shifts to new legal paradigms. The first example relates to 
changes in the existing process of rule formation, i.e. the review and reformulation of the European legislative 
process towards more participatory models and the consequent alteration of decision making processes and 
instruments for the enforcement of European law. In the early days of European level regulatory activity, 
decisions were mostly promulgated in the form of Directives and such an approach resulted in the proliferation 
of  versions  of  legal  texts  dealing  with  the  same  issue  in  different  countries.  Consequently  administrative 
difficulties,  bureaucratic  overload,  ambiguity  and  opportunities  for  non-compliance  became  frequent 
phenomena. Considering these constraints, European public institutions have recently consciously shifted their 
                                                           
1 As shown in Annex Two and Three, the latest detergents legislation is the outcome of several revisions of the 1973 
Directive regulating the biodegradability of surfactants, while the REACH agreement is the descendant of the Dangerous 
Substances Directive (1967).  
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approach to legal intervention towards the promulgation of new legislation through the conversion of existing 
Directives into Regulations that are directly applicable -namely they create rules with immediate effect similar 
to a national instruments in all Member States and without any further action on the part of the national 
authorities (EUR-Lex, 2008).  
A second example relates to changes in the problem-solving heuristics, and more specifically, the manner in 
which responsibility is allocated between authorities and addressees. REACH is considered by the industry 
representatives to have “set a totally new paradigm in the way we look at the problem” as it reversed the 
normal process of product regulation. Prior to REACH, companies were able to market launch a product and 
were only obliged to provide safety information if public authorities identified a problem related to the product 
and challenged them. Hence, the responsibility of testing new products against environmental protection and 
human safety criteria belonged to public authorities  and the provision of information was only a case of 
reaction to public challenges. However this proved to be a very inefficient way of tackling the matter and its 
failure was attributed to lack of resources (in the authorities’ view) and bureaucratic reasons and lack of 
competence (in industry’s view). The new chemicals regulation, REACH, came to substitute the existing legal 
paradigm and shift the responsibility to the producers of new technology by reversing the onus of proof. Under 
the new regime companies can commercialize a chemical substance only if they demonstrate in advance that 
its use is safe.  This transition is considered by the industry as a major revolution in the management of 
chemicals as it prolongs the time required for new products to enter the market, increases the production 
costs, and creates possibilities that challenges might originate from more stakeholders whose expertise on the 
issue can sometimes be questioned.  
Thirdly, shifts between legal paradigms can be considered in terms of changes in the scope of regulation. In the 
case of GHS, the globally harmonized requirements for labeling required by the regulation, demanded the 
development  of  a  transnational  and  intercontinental  regulatory  process  as  no  single  existing  national  or 
transnational  regulatory  process  was  adequate  or  sufficiently  dominant  to  support  the  development  and 
implementation of such regulation. This resulted in a new legal process based on international collaboration.  
These examples indicate transitions to new legal paradigms due to arising inefficiencies and the continuous 
improvement, accumulation and transmission of knowledge between the increasing variety of stakeholders 
involved in the regulatory process. Changes in legislation are the combined results of advances located in 
various  scientific  disciplines  and  embodied  in  individuals  belonging  to  various  social  groups.  In  our  case, 
changes have been induced on the one hand by advances in chemistry and consequently the development of 
new substances as well as the development of testing methods to assess the properties of the new substances. 
The penetration of such knowledge into the policy circles and especially into the regulatory agencies resulted in 
responsive  efforts  on  the  part  of  regulators  and  policy  makers  to  develop  processes  and  instruments 
appropriate for the mediation of issues related to the assessment of chemicals. On the other hand, political 
and  legal  science  has  also  been  evolving  following  its  own  momentum  in  response  to  the  changing 
characteristics of the European political system. Policy objectives based on the rationales of integration and 
harmonization are translated into efforts for the development of policy processes, institutional structures and 
policies aiming to facilitate the governance of this multi-actor and multi-level system which offers a fertile 
ground for interaction and information exchange. Then the provision a “commonly accepted basis of collective 
action” Slembeck (1997: 227) becomes the major task of politics and hence, similarly to innovation, the legal 
process can be seen as a problem solving process whose resolution is determined and dependent upon the  
7 
mobilization of various types of agents that share knowledge and heuristics and that collaborate to achieve 
their targets.  
3.2 The variety-selection-retention triptych  
There are three sequential mechanisms that lie at the heart of evolutionary processes and that we expect to 
find at work in the regulatory process. Loasby (1999: 25) notes that evolution comprises of “the generation of 
variety, the reduction of variety (selection) and some persistence (retention) both in the characteristics of the 
variants and in the environment in which they are selected”.  
The generation of variety in evolutionary applications in social sciences is ensured by the fact that agents are 
capable of experimenting and discovering new rules and, thus, continuously introduce behavioral novelties into 
the system (Dosi and Nelson, 1994). In politics variety refers to policy strategies, programs and instruments and 
is attributed to the diversity of ideas, preferences and interests of policy agents that compete to bring their 
concerns onto policy agendas (John, 1998; Slembeck, 1997; Modelski, 1996). Regulations can be considered as 
formal  expressions  of  rules  whose  variety  is  guaranteed  by  the  array  of  policy  problems  that  arise  from 
interactions of agents with different political preferences and beliefs which themselves evolve in response to 
existing institutions (Rubin, 2002) and introduce new knowledge into the political system. Following Dopfer et 
al. (2004), the introduction of new knowledge carried by an agent with a new understanding and with skills of 
persuasion into a system of actors is the initial phase of an evolutionary process generating new rules, an idea 
which offers us a clear starting point for analyzing the process of emergence of regulations.  
Certainly not all newly introduced issues are or can be resolved by regulatory action and hence selection must 
take  place  to  reduce  the variety  and number  of issues likely to  attract  policy resources.    An  aspect  that 
distinguishes biological and social sciences models of evolutionary analysis is that in the social sciences both 
variation and selection processes are largely dependent and controlled by purposeful individuals (Pierson, 
2000) or following Loasby (1999), are channeled by human institutions. This implies though that selection 
criteria may evolve in accordance to the forces influencing agents’ beliefs, perceptions and preferences and 
hence, which given the social context of politics selection criteria, may confront the question of “endogeneity” 
(Dosi and Nelson, 1994: 156) and potential political capture. 
The third building block of an evolutionary process is the existence of “inertial forces that provide continuity to 
what survives the winnowing” (Nelson, 1995: 56), namely the existence of a mechanism that facilitates the 
adaptation and maintenance of novelties introduced in the system. Interpreting novelties as new sets of rules, 
(Dopfer et al., 2004) refer to this stage as “retention” which involves the maintenance of the novel rule and its 
replication; retention describes a phase in which the new rule is normalized and new divisions of labor emerge 
including structures of knowledge as well as regional and industrial organization.  In our view, the entrance of a 
new rule at this stage, constitutes a proof of fitness and signals the commencement of a period of relative 
stability in the sense of the temporary cease of struggle of ideas and interests related to a particular political 
problem. In politics the adoption and maintenance of novel rules in the system is ensured, at least for a 
considerable period of time, due to the characteristics of the institutional structures within which they evolve. 
Namely, once a regulation reaches the stage of implementation, its diffusion and retention in the system is 
guaranteed  by  the  principle  of  compulsory  compliance  and,  then,  novel  regulations  can  be  seen  as  legal 
innovations that are the outcome of a collective problem solving process (Eckardt, 2004).   
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4.  The regulatory process through an evolutionary lens 
Seeking to explain how the variety-selection- retention triptych facilitates the regulatory process at each of its 
stages, in this section we identify four phases of the emergence of new regulations. In doing so we build upon 
the “cognitive evolutionary framework” developed by Slembeck (1997), who analyzed the process of policy 
formation and implementation as a collective process of mobilization and problem solving, triggered by the 
emergence of policy issues based on individual beliefs and perceptions; ambiguity or discontent are considered 
the main drivers that induce actors to take action and bring their ideas onto the policy agenda.  
The cognitive evolutionary framework is based on the distinction of three policy levels, the “individual”, the 
“collective” and the “constitutional”. The constitutional level defines the institutions, rules and procedures of 
the policy process; the collective level is where the actual problem-solving process takes place, while the 
individual level is where the initiation of policy change begins. This three layer analytical approach is a helpful 
guide for our analysis though some distinctions need to be drawn. Firstly, the regulations under study do not 
address individual citizens so the individual level is as micro as the organizational level (i.e. a firm, a NGO, a 
governmental department). Secondly, the collective level does not solely refer to the public domain (as in 
Slembeck´s  analysis),  but  describes  the  state  where  a  problem  has  been  acknowledged  as  worth  the 
investment  of  resources  by  a  variety  of  stakeholders.  Finally,  the  constitutional  level  is  the  institutional 
environment within which policy processes take place. A useful way to think about the three levels is to relate 
the individual with a space where a variety of ideas exist embedded in actors organized in groups; to consider 
the collective level as a space where intense interactions take place aiming to solve a policy problem; while the 
constitutional level is a space comprising of structured sets of rules.  
The initial phase of the process begins with the emergence of a policy problem and its acknowledgement as 
requiring regulatory action. Regulators are faced with a variety of issues to be resolved while the type of policy 
issue to be tackled will partly determine the type of solution, namely the type of regulation. In this sense and 
seeking to explain why regulations have the form they have, the first thing we need to investigate is the source 
and type of problems that induce legal change.  
The stage following the acknowledgement of an issue is its incorporation in the collective agenda, which 
implies acknowledgement of importance. Considering the participatory nature of the characteristics of the 
European regulatory process, policy issues to be resolved with regulatory action become part of the agendas of 
different stakeholders public and private (i.e. firms, NGOs, industrial associations, national governments, etc.). 
Hence we identify an intermediate step between the emergence of an issue and the commencement of its 
solution, which is its inclusion in multiple agendas.  At this stage we expect to find a variety of decision making 
processes that relate to the different structure of organizations and which yield the stakeholders´ approach to 
the definition and level of importance of the arising regulatory issue and determine the course of action they 
adopt.  Conflicts  and  tensions  may  arise  within  each  of  different  stakeholders’  groups  and  an  internal 
winnowing of varieties of ideas must take place before stakeholders define their positions and attempt to 
communicate and defend their decisions to other groups. The externalization of stakeholder’s positions is 
related to what Slembeck calls “initial mobilization” which refers to actors’ efforts to “mobilize others in order 
to promulgate their own perception of the problem” (p.231).   
After the definition of the problem has been finalized and stakeholders have revealed their initial position to 
the issue, what follows is the selection among possible solutions. Modelski (1996) refers to this process as the  
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“macro-decision” describing the selection process that determines which policy strategies will persist and be 
followed.  Solutions  to  policy  problems  are  chosen  among  a  variety  of  potential  policy  measures  and  are 
dependent on (i) the type of problem in question and (ii) the distribution of relevant to the problem knowledge 
among participating stakeholders.  Slembeck (1997) distinguishes problems between “novel” and “routine”; 
the former mobilize formal decision making mechanisms (e.g. legislative processes) and the latter are tackled 
by following bureaucratic procedures.  In this paper the analysis is concentrated on issues that ignite the 
regulatory process and that entail negotiations mostly focused on influencing the content of the measure 
rather  than  its  type.  As  mentioned  in  Section  2  the  institutional  structure  of  the  EU  regulatory  process 
increases the demand for expert knowledge which in our case is mostly located outside the policy circles. Such 
a demand, combined with differences in knowledge capabilities of participants, suggests that the solution of 
the problem is dependent on “who holds the most relevant information”.    
The concluding stage of the regulatory processes is the implementation of the selected measures which also 
entails  a  selection  process  seeking  to  define  the  rules,  procedures  and  delegated  governmental  agency 
essential to enforce the novel rule.  This is the “reinforcement/execution” stage (Modelski, 1996) in which 
policy innovations and selected strategies are diffused within the policy system. At this stage agency conflicts 
may arise and regulation authorities need to ensure that the selected delegates are the ones equipped with 
relevant knowledge. 
So  far  we  have identified  four  distinct  phases  of  the  regulatory  process  within which the mechanisms  of 
variation and selection manifest themselves. These phases are depicted in Figure 1 that is our conceptual map 
for the empirical contextualization of these processes, which is the focus of the remainder of this section.   
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Figure 1: EU Regulatory process through an evolutionary lens 
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forth. The pieces of legislation discussed in this paper have different sources and have arisen at different policy 
levels. In what follows we present three cases of regulations that are indicative of the variety of sources and 
levels of initiation of legal change. Following our evidence, legal action might be induced by ambiguity triggered 
by environmental externalities (as in the case of the 2004 Detergents Regulation), discontent attributed to 
inefficiencies of existing legal regimes and lack of information (as in the case of REACH) and institutional 
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4.1.1.  Environmental externalities and the 2004 Detergents Regulation  
The  example  of  the  detergent  regulation  is  indicative  of  cases  in  which  novelties  in  the  socioeconomic 
environment  bring  about  novelties in  the  political agenda  and  more  specifically  the  legislative  aquis. The 
transition from soap and synthetic detergents during the 1950s was accompanied by public concerns related to 
the properties of the new products. The two points most commonly discussed by scientists, the public and the 
authorities (at individual level), were the effects on the skin of the user and problems of the disposal of the 
materials after their use. The first developments towards the formal interpretation of such phenomena and the 
resolution  of  concerns  were  expressed  through  public  reports  (e.g.  the  UK  report  by  the  Committee  on 
Synthetic Detergents appointed by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government) that protected the then 
infant industry,  reassuring  the  public  that  there  was  no  cause  for  alarm with  regards  to  the  skin  related 
problems, while, concerns about the effects of the disposal of synthetic detergents through sewage were 
considered justified but not irresolvable (Corlett, 1958). The first evidence of negative externalities of the new 
technology became obvious in the 1960s, when many Member States experienced foaming problems in rivers 
and lakes that were attributed to the fact that surfactants were not completely degraded by the bacteria 
naturally present in effluents. The technical character of the issues increased demand for expert scientific 
knowledge in order to resolve ambiguity and discontent regarding the connection of pollution phenomena with 
detergents. The attribution of foaming phenomena to the non-biodegradability of polyphosphates and the 
existence of scientific proof for what was to become a policy issue accelerated the interpretation and definition 
of the issue and solved differences in perceptions, while it comprised the common basis for the inquiry of its 
solution. Combined efforts of the industry and the authorities contributed to the development of testing 
methods which were incorporated as clauses in subsequent regulations.  
4.1.2.  Lack of information, administrative inefficiency and REACH  
Discontent and ambiguity were also the drivers for political action in the case of REACH. Political discussions 
about changes of the chemicals regulation and the introduction of a new regime, commenced in 2003 due to 
the  so  far  poor  results  of  the  evaluation  process  for  dangerous  substances  and  the  observed  lack  of 
information. More specifically, out of the 141 substances prioritized for comprehensive risk assessments with 
the 1993 Existing Substances Regulation (ESR) only 28 were completed by 2003, while during the evaluations 
that actually took place it was commonly noticed that the producers of compounds and formulations were not 
fully aware of the potential applications and subsequent harmful effects of the substances included in their 
products.  Such  lack  of  information  was  translated  into  difficulties  to  determine  the  acceptable  levels  of 
exposure to consumers and the environment and provide adequate guidance. Discussions and concerns about 
the existing legislation were initiated among stakeholders already participating in the policy process about an 
issue that was already in the agenda of public authorities (collective level). Interpretations of the observed 
inefficiencies were formally sought and based on evaluations of the previous policy, a case that shows that the 
initiation of radical legal change does not always require novel issues to be brought onto the political agenda, 
rather legal innovations can arise from successive changes.   
4.1.3.  Institutional mismatches, lack of information and GHS 
GHS is a case of regulation whose origins are related to the existence of multiple standards (sets of rules) and 
differences  in  institutional  structures  (constitutional  level).  The  process  for  the  formulation  of  a  Globally 
Harmonized System for classification and labeling was triggered by the initiative of surfactant manufacturers  
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outside the EU to classify their products according to existing legislation in their region as “substances with 
serious damage to eyes”.  This information raised concerns among regulatory and standard setting authorities 
in other continents and resulted in intense negotiations about the characterization and classification standards 
of such substances. Leading the discussions in terms of the stringency of requirements and following the 
existing  European  standards  of  classification,  the  responsible  working  group  of  the  European  Commission 
stated that any formulation containing more than 10% of this substance, regardless of its application, should be 
classified under a more stringent characterization. Following the precautionary principle, further discussions 
were stimulated resulting in a reduction from 10% to 3% of acceptable proportions of this substance. The 
United Nations working group that coordinated the negotiations brought to the attention of the participating 
experts the fact that there was a disparity of labeling symbols across continents and as the European one was 
not universally applicable, an alternative needed to be developed. The new labeling system is already finalized 
and has entered the process of implementation. This is an interesting example of the unintended mobilization 
of  the  policy  process  in  the  sense  that  the  actors  who  change  their  perception  of  an  issue  (i.e.  the 
manufacturers of surfactants changing the characterization of their product) have no incentive or objective to 
initiate policy process leading to legal change.   
4.2 Multiple agendas  
An integral part of the EU regulatory process is that the acknowledgement of an issue requiring legal action is 
formally expressed by a proposal for action composed and announced by the European Commission. The 
Commission´s proposal is the result of an extensive consultation process in which various types of stakeholders 
(national experts, international organizations, non-governmental organizations as well as different Commission 
departments) are formally requested to participate. Following this procedure, the policy issues considered 
relevant for legal action immediately become part of multiple agendas. For instance, the biodegradation issue 
became  part  of  the  agenda  of  the  industry  producing  suspect  substances,  the  industrial  associations 
representing this industry, the non-governmental organizations and environmental groups concerned with the 
implications  of  pollution  phenomena,  special  technical  groups  within  the  European  institutions,  national 
experts and so forth.  
At this stage, non-governmental stakeholders have two types of decisions to make. The first is related to the 
importance of the issue for the organization and the respective internal allocation of tasks in order to provide 
the information required by the provisions of the Consultation process. The second decision is related to the 
selection of additional means of external communication of the organizations’ positions, given the fact that 
actors are prone to try to alter the outcome of the process for their own benefit. We find that the processes of 
internalization of forthcoming regulatory activity as well as externalization strategies differ according to the 
type of stakeholder and partly determine the means of their further engagement into the process.  
Simultaneous  processes  of  agenda  setting  take  place  in  three  distinct  stages.  The  first stage  involves  the 
internal process of interpretation and management aiming at improving each stakeholder´s position against the 
expected changes in their environment. The criteria for assessing whether issues are sufficiently important 
attract resources are partly individual, partly induced by the economic and political system and also depend on 
the availability of resources, opportunity costs, etc. Once individual (in the sense of organizational) positions 
are crystallized, stakeholders interact with co-actors (i.e. firms interact with other firms, NGOs with other 
NGOs) and aiming to strengthen their influencing power, they establish coalitions. Coalitioning is the second 
stage of the process of agenda setting and confirms the argument that individuals rarely act in isolation against  
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economic and political challenges (Modelski, 1996) i.e. individual knowledge gradually becomes a population 
property (Metcalfe and Foster, 2004; Scharpf, 1997). Equipped with more knowledge and increased bargaining 
power, coalitions of actors then enter the policy arena to promote their interests. Contextualizing the stage of 
multiple  agenda  setting,  next  we  present  some  empirical  evidence  for  the  non-governmental  actors  that 
participated in the negotiations for the regulations under study.  
4.2.1  Private firms   
The internalization process of regulation varies across firms and mostly depends on the availability of financial 
and  human  resources,  which  are  in  turn  related  to  size.  Large  firms  usually  have  in  place  established 
departments  or  units  dealing  with  regulatory  matters,  as  well  as  well  planned  strategies  and  respective 
allocation of human resources. In contrast, smaller firms tend to shift existing staff members to different 
positions  and  rely  more  on  external  support  as  their  stance  is  formulated  by  the  creation  of  coalitions, 
participation in national associations and constant exchange of information with the authorities. Information 
and knowledge asymmetries between firms of different size are usually tackled by governments and legislators 
who set up supportive services (e.g. the helpdesks established for REACH), aware of the limited access of 
smaller size firms to valuable information about the requirements and management of regulation and driven 
by their own interest to successfully implement a novel measure.  
The externalization of companies’ decisions and positions can be achieved through various channels and is 
usually  not  immediate.  With  the  exception  of  large  multinational  firms,  the  communication  of  individual 
companies’ opinions does not reach the policy makers directly; rather, an intermediate communication process 
takes  place  within  the  industrial  circles.  Communication  is  orchestrated  by  industrial  associations  and 
facilitated by organized workshops and formal or informal meetings aiming at the formulation of common 
positions to be presented and supported in negotiations with other types of stakeholders.  Knowledge and 
information asymmetries are present also in this process during which information exchange at industrial level 
is mostly beneficial to firms lacking information, while the value added, in terms of new information, for 
knowledgeable firms remains low. Clearly, knowledgeable agents may confront the trade-off between active 
participation in the process and disclosure of valuable information, especially in instances where the agents 
they interact with are of lower knowledge competencies and hence free-riding phenomena may be likely.  
4.2.2  Industrial associations 
Internal  decision  making  in  national  and  European  industrial  associations  follows  more  strictly  defined 
procedures that are formally outlined in the memorandum of the associations. Following the most common 
structure, the management committee of the association decides on the degree of importance of emerging 
issues and  proposes the  respective  action  required.  This  can  take the  form of  a  commissioned  study,  an 
organized workshop, an internal meeting, an inquiry letter to the authorities and the members, etc. In the case 
of an anticipated new regulation which is considered relevant and important to the operations of the industry, 
a specific working group within the association is formed chaired by a specialist member of the technical group. 
This working group assesses the implications that the forthcoming regulation might have for the industry, 
proposes  possible  amendments  to  the  text  and  provides  suggestions  regarding  the  manner  in  which  the 
industry could participate to improve the workability of the legislation and/or state its concerns. In the case of 
inadequate human resources associations invite member companies to volunteer and support them with extra 
personnel.   
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Once the positions of the industry have been crystallized, what follows is an intense communication activity. 
National industrial associations of sectors affected by the same regulation coordinate their action and contact 
the national authorities (i.e. ministries and competent authorities specifically dealing with the regulation), 
communicate their views to national representatives in European institutions, discuss their views with national 
NGOs and interact with their counterpart European associations to provide them with information about the 
national  characteristics  and  outcomes  of  negotiations.  In  turn,  European  associations,  equipped  with 
information about the general trend in Europe, focus their action towards the European institutions involved to 
the regulatory process, namely the specific units of Directorate Generals (DGs) (Detergents unit, Chemicals 
Unit,  REACH  Unit),  the  Parliament  (MEPs,  and  specialized  Committees  for  instance  Environment,  Internal 
Market, Energy and Trade), the Presidency, the representatives of multinational firms and the international 
representations of NGOs.  In addition to the regular meetings organized by the European institutions, industrial 
associations  engage  in  the  process  via  accumulating  and  disseminating  information  through  media 
publications, statement positions as well as informal communications. The positions of associations are of 
special value to the authorities since they represent considerable population of private agents and include 
aggregations of opinions.  
4.2.3  NGOs 
NGOs are organized interest groups, who aim to take action on specific issues and hence their orientation with 
regards to the issues they engage with is to an extent predetermined. Most of the NGOs acting at international 
level have established agendas comprising global priorities within which they set specific targets selected on 
the  basis  of  observations  and  scientific  developments  in  fields  related  to  their  action  (e.g.  aquatic  life, 
chemicals, human health). Nevertheless their agenda is active and evolving as new knowledge and emerging 
issues may be translated in opportunities of action, as for instance in the case of growing public attention 
surrounding the operations of the chemicals industry.  The decision of whether to engage in a new issue is 
closely related to the availability of human resources, while considering the more loose management structure 
of such organizations (in comparison to private firms), national NGO branches have the freedom to decide 
whether they wish to participate in newly emerging issues and determine their degree of involvement.  
In the case of NGOs, “non-participation” to public debates and negotiations may sometime prove to be more 
strategic than active involvement as, following their testimonies, there are instances in which their presence in 
meetings on economic and industrial related issues is considered by the media or other stakeholders as a proxy 
of general agreement to the issues under discussion.  Although NGOs follow a less rigid structure of decision 
making and agenda setting they keep open channels of communication between themselves and organize 
frequent  intra-organizational  meetings  in  order  to  establish  common  positions,  common  strategies  and 
common modes of action and pressure towards the authorities. Communication between the industry and 
NGOs is weaker as they usually stand on opposite sides though some examples of good will exist.   
Hence, following various channels of communication and equipped with new knowledge, crystallized agendas 
and strategies, and a better potential to influence the outcome of the process, coalitions of stakeholders enter 
the arena of negotiations aiming to select between alternative solutions.  
4.3 Solution selection 
The results of the consultation process yield a variety of opinions on the possible solution of the policy issue 
awaiting resolution through regulation. A specialized working group of the Commission is required to assess  
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stakeholders’  contributions  and  prepare  the  text  of  the  proposal.  While  this  is  being  prepared,  non-
governmental stakeholders exercise their strategies of influence and engagement on a more informal and 
bilateral basis. Informal interactions between public and private agents continue during the reading of the 
legislative proposal by the Parliament and the Council and the possible amendments proposed for the legal 
text. At this stage, individuals need to convince and mobilize as many actors as possible, in order to put 
forward their ideas and concerns to a wider group of agents; processes of collective interpretation and mutual 
persuasion are then at work aiming at the creation of a commonly accepted basis for action (Slembeck, 1997). 
The time required for the selection of a widely accepted solution is depended on the source of the policy issue 
and the level of codification of related information. For instance policy issues stemming from environmental 
externalities  (e.g.  foaming  attributed  to  non-biodegradability  of  polyphosphates)  are  resolved  faster  than 
persisting  social  phenomena,  due  to  the  existence and  codification  of  scientific  proof;  this  reinforces  the 
argument that the influencing power of agents is also a function of their interpretative competences and the 
availability  of  information  (Bowen,  2001;  Slembeck,  1997;  Sharpf,  1997).  An  illustrative  example  is  the 
determination of the testing methods for the assessment of the biodegradability of surfactants. In this case, 
manufacturers of surfactants developed testing methods for biodegradability when the first concerns about 
foaming incidents resulted in pressure on the industry and while no regulatory requirements existed yet. When 
the issue of biodegradability entered the agenda of European Institutions and the assessment of particular 
substances was considered essential, the opinion of the industry pioneers was highly valued and smoothly 
combined with existing OECD practices without long negotiations or conflicts. Due to the concentration of 
expertise outside the policy circles, public action and negotiations concentrated on the level of stringency of 
restrictions and the type of policy measure that would impose the decided thresholds on biodegradability, 
while the actual solution, the substitution of the harmful substance, was realized by private agents driven by 
additional  market  incentives.  But  this  is  not  where  the  story  ends;  interestingly,  the  dynamic  nature  of 
knowledge accumulation is reflected on the evolution of political solutions, and ideas about solutions for public 
problems  are  continually  emerging  (John,  1998).  Returning  to  our  example,  evaluation  and  assessment 
methods  for  substances  contained  in  detergents  have  been  increasing  in  terms  of  sophistication  and 
effectiveness.  Research  on  biodegradability  assessment  methods  is  ongoing  and  an  increasing  volume  of 
studies  are  conducted  by  experts  of  the  field,  commissioned  and  financed  by  public  authorities  who  are 
interested in updating relevant regulatory provisions.  
4.4 Implementation  
Once a common position on the legal text has been agreed between the Parliament and the Council, the 
negotiation  process  is  concluded,  leading  to  the  implementation  of  the  decided  text.  A  different  sort  of 
selection process commences, which entails the delegation of the responsible governmental agency to enforce 
the regulation. In this case, national governments need to decide internally and propose to the Commission the 
relevant department (Competent Authority) that will be responsible for the implementation of the new legal 
requirements. The identification of relevant ministries is usually straightforward. Nevertheless, due to the 
multiple objectives of European regulations there are instances where more than one ministry needs to be 
involved. This selection is usually done on the basis of resource availability and synergies of operations but can 
sometimes be timely.  
The UK example for the 2004 Regulation is indicative of the multitude of parallel negotiations and discussions 
at the implementation stage. In 2002, the announcement of the forthcoming Detergent Regulation by the 
European authorities and the respective responsibilities of national governments initiated policy discussions  
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between the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs  (DEFRA)  concerning  the  responsibility  for  implementing  the  proposed  Regulation.  Initially  both 
departments posed resistance to the responsibility of implementing the forthcoming regulation and after a 
series of negotiations DEFRA was appointed as the responsible ministry. It was then that a second round of 
negotiations began, this time internal to the department. The reluctance of the Water Quality Division (the 
agency so far responsible for detergents) to undertake the responsibility on the grounds of administrative 
burden made essential the quest for alternatives. DEFRA sought advice from the private sectors and consulted 
the national industrial association for cleaning products (UKCPI) which pointed to the competence of the 
Pesticides Safety Directorate (PSD). PSD was asked for any objections and finally appointed as Competent 
Authority in 2004.  
The implementation stage signals the commencement of the diffusion of legal innovations into the system 
while it also defines a new structure for the interactions between public and private actors. Interactions may 
become complicated and implementation difficulties may arise due to false expectations on the part of the 
bureaucrats  as  well  as  dual  roles  delegated  to  a  single  authority.  The  case  study  material  revealed  two 
examples attributing empirical context to such issues. The first refers to the management of the derogation 
provision of the Detergents Regulation; false signaling about to the number of firms and substances addressed 
by the regulation, created to the Competent Authorities anticipation of large piles of applications due to arrive 
at their premises as soon as the measure was promulgated. In the light of this expectedly big workload, heated 
negotiations  took  place  over  who  should  administer  the  issues  and  the  budget  to  be  allocated  for  the 
completion of the task. Several interdepartmental meetings took place and tens of emails were exchanged, 
only to be confirmed as a proof of false expectations by the low number (less than ten) of applications for 
derogation throughout Europe. 
The second example of implementation difficulties is connected to the establishment of national “help-desks” 
which  aim  to  support  and  guide  actors  with  regards  to  the  provisions  of  REACH.  The  selection  of  the 
departments  to  provide  such  a  service  resulted  in two  structures;  some  Member  States  established  new 
departments, independent of, but working in collaboration with the Competent Authorities for REACH, while 
others (the majority) established the help desks as a separate team within the Competent Authorities. The 
latter type of arrangement resulted into concerns in industrial circles since the governmental department 
offering  the  information  on  the  specifications  of  the  regulation  was  also  the  one  responsible  for  the 
enforcement  and  control  of  the  measure.  Firms  admitted  their  reluctance  to  seek  advice  from  REACH 
helpdesks as this would involve them disclosing information based on which they could be judged on.  Such 
conflict gave rise to the need of intermediary organizations i.e. consultants specializing on regulatory matters, 
who have know established their role in the implementation process.  
5.   Regulation: an institutional innovation process 
In analyzing the process of regulation formulation, an evolutionary process of rule emergence is observed. In its 
first stage, once an issue has attracted the attention of the regulating authorities, there follows an array of 
simultaneous internal selection processes and the subsequent externalization of their results (fit solutions, 
positions) triggered by the authorities request for consultation and demand for specialized knowledge. This 
situation fits the notion of the emergence of a new rule, described by Dopfer et al. (2004:271) as the phase of 
the evolutionary process “where an agent develops an idea/rule that leads to the design of an organization of  
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people, energy and materials”. Indeed, the anticipation of the introduction of a new rule into the existing 
institutional structure triggers an intense period of interactions and information dissemination among different 
agents (individual level) who need to incorporate the new rule into their agendas, establish a position on the 
matter  and  represent  their  view  at  a  higher  level  (collective  level).  The  next  stage  of  the  process  is 
characterized by the adoption and adaptation of the newly proposed rule by a variety of stakeholders that 
through competition, interact and create variants of the rule (variants of legal provisions to be included in the 
final text), which constitutes the “diffusion phase” in the Dopfer et al. (2004) framework. Finally, the new rule 
enters the third stage of the process, its “retention”, in which it is further diffused and maintained in the 
system through its implementation by the delegated authorities, who need to ensure that the regulation is 
properly implemented and retained perpetually or at least until a new institutional challenge arises. Within this 
framework  the  regulatory  process  resembles  an  innovative  process  that  yields  new  sets  of  rules,  new 
“technologies of governance” (Voss, 2007) or “legal innovations” (Eckardt, 2004). In this vein, Figure 1 can be 
extended to incorporate the three stages of an evolutionary processes mentioned above (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Regulation: an evolutionary process 
 
The lower part of the figure is intentionally left open to denote that this process is iterative and dynamic, 
fuelled by learning processes that are prone to resolve (or even reinforce) institutional lock-ins. It has become 
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stakeholders  who  have incentives  to improve  their  knowledge  and  hence, learning  processes  are  present 
throughout the whole regulatory process. Following the traditional political science accounts, this process 
reaches its peak at the implementation stage where it is considered to have accomplished its objective to 
tackle a policy problem through the promulgation of a new regulation. Nevertheless, in our view and through 
an evolutionary lens to politics, the implementation of a new regulation signals the diffusion of a novel rule and 
reconfigures the existing institutional structure.  
Changes  in  the  institutional  structure  will  result  in  changes  in  the  perceptions  of  individuals  and  their 
consequent mobilization to alter constitutional elements; in turn changes in the constitutional environment 
will have implications for the individual perceptions hence giving new momentum to the policy process (flows 1 
and 2 in Figure 3). In addition, individuals and evolving constitutional arrangements can affect the political 
constellations located at the collective level, and thereby influence the possibilities, limitations and outcomes 
of the political processes (flows 3 and 4 in Figure). This may alter individual perceptions once more and hence 
refuel the process described.  
 
Figure 3: Regulatory dynamics
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Overall, the outcomes of the policy process at each stage incorporate novel knowledge that feeds back into the 
system  through  learning  and  which  contributes  to  its  evolution.  Throughout  the  whole  process  of  policy 
formation and implementation, the basic mechanisms of evolution are at work and essential for the transition 
of  ideas  and  knowledge  between  different  levels  of  the  political  system,  which  itself  evolves,  fuelled  by 
knowledge accumulation and transmission.  
Describing  the  regulatory  process  through  an  evolutionary  lens,  what  we  actually  witness  is  a  course  of 
knowledge originating from individual ideas and perceptions and its transformation into constitutional rules 
through collective problem solving activities. Hence, the process of emergence of a new policy –regulation- can 
be viewed as a process of knowledge accumulation, organization and transmission, resembling the innovation 
                                                           








process.  Politics  offer  a  forum  where  a  variety  of  stakeholders  interact  and  purposefully  reveal  their 
preferences.  Policy  targets  and  demand  for  well  articulated  policy  instruments  encourage  efforts  for  a 
combination  of  knowledge  distributed  among  various  interest  groups;  such  efforts  result  in  institutional 
innovations in the sense of novel structures of knowledge with implications for the behavior of all agents that 
participated in their construction. The issue of knowledge concentration and its relevance to bargaining power 
that directs policy discussions becomes very interesting and is one worth further investigation.   
6.   Conclusions 
This paper focused on the study of the process of emergence of new institutions and sought to identify factors 
that  may  influence  its  outcome.  Placing  this  study  within  the  European  political  system  and  by  drawing 
evidence from regulations framing the activity of the detergents industry, we found that the evolutionary 
approaches to the policy process offer a useful guide in explaining the emergence, diffusion and retention of 
new regulations.  
Considering regulations and institutions as sets of rules we argue that the regulatory process resembles the 
innovation process as it exhibits the attributes an evolutionary process and can be viewed as a process ignited 
by the continuous emergence of a variety of issues that stem from ambiguity and discontent and that seek 
regulatory solution. Following a selection process, issues worth attracting political resources then become part 
of multiple agendas, an element emphasizing the variety of stakeholders involved in the process and the hazy 
nature of boundaries between public and private decision making within the specific institutional context. 
Agenda setting and mobilization comprises the second stage of the process where variety and selection are 
again present. Here, a variety of internalization and externalization strategies were observed denoting that 
differences  in  the  competences  and  orientation  of  stakeholders  partly  determine  the  nature  of  their 
engagement in the regulatory process as well as their relative influencing power. Hence, different types of 
stakeholders guarantee variety in terms of means of engagement in the process and pursuing strategies and 
participate actively in the selection between alternative policy solutions.  During this stage of the process we 
found that (i) the source of the problem, (ii) the policy level of its emergence and (iii) the distribution of 
relevant  information  among  the  participants  to  the  process,  are  important  factors  that  may  influence  its 
outcome. More specifically, regulations induced by environmental externalities tend to be accommodated 
easily by pioneers in the technological front due to the accumulation of technical expertise, while regulations in 
response to administrative inefficiencies that require the reallocation of responsibilities tend to cause tensions 
and  take  longer  to  be  internalized  by  their  addressees.  At  this  stage  the  comparative  advantage  of 
knowledgeable agents becomes apparent and confirms the idea of resource dependencies between policy 
agents that in its negative expressions might result in political capture.  
In addition, the policy level (i.e. individual, collective or constitutional) in which the policy issue is first observed 
influences the manner in which the issue will be resolved and corresponds to different directions of knowledge 
flows and interactions. For instance, the essential information for the resolution of the foaming issue was 
transmitted from social groups to the public authorities (bottom-up direction) as initial observations were 
made  by  the  public  and  scientists  (individual  level).  Conversely, in  the  case  of  REACH  inefficiencies  were 
identified  by  authorities  (constitutional  level)  who  initiated  the  process  of  legal  change  and  information 
dissemination towards the industry and the general public (top-down).  
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The final stage of the process is the implementation of new rules and signals the phase of diffusion and 
retention of the institutional innovations. The variation-selection mechanisms reappear at the implementation 
stage  and  determine  the  procedures  and  agents  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  the  regulation. 
Implementation difficulties arise in response to false expectations driven by limited information as well as 
situations in which public actors can incorporate two different roles simultaneously, relating to the well known 
principal agent problem. In spite of the practical difficulties, the implementation stage also heralds the further 
diffusion and retention of the novel rule into the  system that is accompanied by changes in the existing 
constitutional structure.  Changes in the institutional structure that frames agents’ activities (the constitutional 
level) are expected to be accompanied by changes in agents’ perceptions and preferences; these changes 
refuel the regulatory process and guarantee the continuous evolution of institutions, under the condition that 
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ANNEX TWO: THE 2004 DETERGENTS REGULATION 
The 2004 Detergents Regulation is the improved and expanded descendant of the 1973 Framework Directive on 
Biodegradability promulgated by the European Authorities and is an indicative case of smooth legislative succession 
supported by collaboration between authorities and industry. Its policy aim was described as “ensuring the free 
movement of detergents and surfactants for detergents in the internal market and a high degree of protection of the 
environment and human health” (EC 648/2004). The latest review of existing legislation aimed to meet global 
environmental targets, consider technological advancements related to the product, formalize existing voluntary 
agreements and level regulatory differences among Member States. The 2004 Detergents Regulation introduced a new 
testing regime on the biodegradability of surfactants while it distinguished requirements for surfactants for domestic 
use on one hand and industrial/institutional applications on the other. According to the legal test, surfactants for 
domestic use that fail to pass the stringent biodegradability test have to be withdrawn from the market unless the 
manufacturers are granted derogation by the European Commission. Apart from the tighter biodegradability testing 
requirements for the active ingredients of detergents, the regulation requires fuller contents information to be provided 
on detergents labels and repeals the previous legislation on detergents (Directives: 73/405, 73/405, 82/242, 82/243, 
86/94 and Recommendation 89/542) (Oliver, 2005). Initiated in 2001, the formulation of the new regulation followed 
the co-decision process. This was also the year when consultations were incorporated formally in the European 
regulatory process and hence the opinion of different stakeholders was officially requested. The figure below presents 
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ANNEX THREE: Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of CHemical substances (REACH) 
The new Chemicals Regulation deals with the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of CHemical 
substances (REACH) (EC 1907/2006). REACH affects the whole chemical industry and respectively the detergents sector 
while it consolidates and harmonizes the hitherto national and European pieces of legislation regulating chemical 
substances. REACH is the descendant of the Dangerous Substances Directive of 1967 (67/548/EC), which was reviewed 
several times mainly with regards to its annexes. Briefly, the development of this regulation occurred as follows. The 
1981 6th Amendment of the Dangerous Substances Directive made compulsory the notification of new substances to a 
system that required testing and risk assessment prior to their marketing. In 1993, the Existing Substances Regulation 
(ESR) prioritized 141 (out of 30,000) substances for comprehensive risk assessments based on rising concerns about 
existing substances. The ESR provided guidelines for the testing, risk assessment and risk management of existing 
substances based on existing data without further requirements. In 1999, the Dangerous Preparations Directive (DPD) 
filled the gaps of the Dangerous Substances Directive (DSD), by regulating preparations and finished products 
accompanied by the 2001 General Product Safety Directive which sets safety requirements for consumer products and is 
of a very wide scope. 
The above regulation placed most of its emphasis on new chemicals and much less on the existing ones. In April 1998, 
the Council of Environment initiated the process for changing the legislation. Since 1998 and for most of the following 
three years there has been increased activity on the part of the authorities, including consultations with relevant 
stakeholders as well as preparation of reports and formal texts. In 2001, an EC White Paper titled “Sustainable 
Development in the EU Chemical industry within the framework of Single Market” was published and heralded the 
beginning of a whole new era for the chemical industry in terms of the legislation framing its activity and the roles 
attributed to different stakeholders. The current legislation is considered to have set a whole new paradigm in the 
management and orientation of chemical firms and its main features involve: 
·  a single system for existing and new substances; 
·  a duty of care for all manufacturers, importers and downstream users of chemicals; 
·  shift of responsibility/ workload from the authorities to the industry; 
·  shift of onus of proof from the authorities to the industry; 
·  authorization system of substances of “very high concern”; 
·  strict deadlines (Scailteur, 2001); 
·  safe use of chemicals across the supply chain. 
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ANNEX FOUR: Globally Harmonized System for classification and labeling (GHS)  
The Globally Harmonized System for Classification and Labeling (GHS) (COM (2007) 355) deals more with information 
dissemination rather than the properties of chemical products and aims at a common basis for the characterization of 
chemical  substances  with  regards  to  their  hazardous  properties.  The  aim  of  the  proposed  regulation  is  to  enable 
judgment on substances and/or mixtures with respect to their hazardous properties, provide hazardous chemicals with 
appropriate labeling and information on safety measures, reduce the need for testing and evaluation of chemicals and 
facilitate  international  trade.  GHS  was  developed  to  overcome  inconsistencies  in  classification  and  hazard 
communication at international level (RPA, 2006). The proposed system presents similarities as well as differences to the 
existing EU system; differences refer mainly to criteria, additional substances and hazards to be considered, evaluation 
of mixtures, concentration limits and some symbol changes. The harmonization of systems is not considered as a novel 
idea since other harmonization efforts were already in place. GHS targets not only the consolidation of national and 
continental  differences  in  semantics,  but  also  seeks  to  provide  a  common  basis  for  classification  and  hazard 
communication for all audiences along the supply chain (i.e. workers, transporters, emergency responders, consumers, 
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